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Seeking God’s blessings. Pentecostal religious discourses, pyramidal 
schemes and money scams in the southeast of Benin Republic 
Sitna Quiroz 
Durham University 
Introduction  
In 2010, thousands of people lost their savings in the Benin Republic during the 
biggest financial scam in the history of this country: the ICC services affair. The 
money investment agency called ICC services (Investment Consultancy and 
Computering [sic] Services) was a money investment agency that operated as a 
pyramidal or Ponzi scheme between 2006 and 2010. After its collapse, it was 
revealed that high-ranking members of the government and religious organisations, 
especially the Celestial Church of Christ and some Pentecostal churches, were 
among those involved in the scam. In recent years, these types of scams have been 
a common phenomenon in many African countries: a feature of neoliberal capitalism 
on this continent (cf. Comaroff, 2009: 22; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2001; Krige, 
2012). 
This chapter explores some of the conditions and relationships that nowadays 
contribute to placing religious organisations in the Benin Republic – mainly Christian 
churches – very close to practices of economic ‘illegality’. In line with the general 
argument of this book, I suggest that these scams do not happen in a vacuum. Nor 
are they due to the lack of ‘moral values’. Instead, fraudulent practices are 
embedded in a set of social norms, values and relationships that are not fraudulent 
per se (Olivier de Sardan, 1999: 26). These norms and values provide the ‘logics’ by 
which fraudulent practices find a way to operate at the intersection of other social 
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dynamics, such as the religious, as it is in this case. This chapter illustrates how in 
the Benin Republic, neoliberal discourses and policies have contributed to creating 
specific conditions in which fraudulent organisations, such as ICC services, find an 
easy way to operate outside official legislation. Thus, the moral economy of financial 
scams is intrinsic to the promotion of neoliberal policies in this country. 
To understand the conditions in which this scam took place in the Benin Republic, I 
argue, we need to pay attention to local ideas of trust, trust-building practices and to 
the role of money in articulating social relations, across religious and non-religious 
contexts. These practices and ideas give us a clue to understanding how fraudulent 
organisations, such as ICC services, acquired social legitimacy and found a way to 
operate in a context where discourses and aspirations of prosperity abound. 
In order to analyse the moral economy of fraud, one needs to take into consideration 
that West African economies and transactions have been shaped throughout their 
history at the interface of European forms of exchange and local social dynamics 
(Guyer, 2004: 5–6). These economies have operated on principles that do not 
conform to models of financial formalisation as outlined in mainstream economic 
theories (Guyer, 2004: 6–7). One of the central principles that articulate economic 
and political relationships in many African contexts is what anthropologists have 
called ‘wealth in people’ (cf. Guyer, 1995). This concept refers to the idea that a 
person’s wealth is not necessarily measured by the accumulation of material 
possessions, instead, wealth is measured by the number and quality of social 
relationships that a person has access to and can mobilise for specific purposes 
(Guyer, 1995: 86). In Benin, the principles and values of ‘wealth in people’ play a 
central role in articulating social, economic and political relationships and in 
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mobilising resources across different social spheres. These principles manifest in 
demonstrations of solidarity measured by economic contributions offered to a ‘client’ 
or potential ‘clients’, relatives or friends. They also manifest in the redistribution of 
resources via gifts of money, the sumptuous distribution of food in public events or 
social gatherings, and when a person delivers on her promises. Failing to comply 
with these principles equates with breaking the bases of trust at interpersonal and 
institutional levels. These breaches of trust account more for what people consider 
unacceptable, rather than the presumed ‘illegality’ of certain economic activities. 
These principles will help us understand the dynamics of the moral economy of fraud 
that the ICC services case illustrates. 
In the first part of this chapter, I present the context in which many Christian 
churches, particularly Pentecostal, have flourished in Africa. In the Benin Republic, 
this happened alongside political changes that led to its ‘democratic transition’ and 
the implementation of neoliberal policies. Second, I describe the way in which ICC 
services started operating in Benin, and the events that led to its collapse. Third, I 
present the role that this and similar money investment agencies played in the 
everyday life of people (the pastor and fellowship) at a local Pentecostal church: the 
Assemblies of God (AoG) in a town that I call here Ipese.1 Finally, I present the 
parallels between the dynamics that shaped the relationship between ICC services 
and their clients, and those between the pastor and his fellowship. I provide a 
general conclusion about how religious discourses were used to legitimise practices 
of money investment, and the role of trust and the dynamics of ‘wealth in people’ in 
this scam.  
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The material I present here is the product of an ethnographic fieldwork of 19 months, 
between 2008 and 2010, in the southeast of the Benin Republic. This fieldwork was 
part of a doctoral research project in anthropology that explored the ways in which 
conversion to Pentecostalism shapes kinship and gender dynamics, and their 
implications for political and economic relations. In this chapter, I refer to events that 
happened in the AoG church in Ipese, a semi-rural  town situated in the proximities 
of the border with Nigeria. Ipese is a multi-ethnic town with approximately 5,000 
people, characterised by the burgeoning commercial activity of its two weekly 
markets. Although this area is predominantly Yoruba, Ipese has a large population of 
migrants from other regions in Benin and Nigeria that belong to different ethnic 
groups. These groups are the Gun, Fon, Bariba and Fulani from Benin, and Igbo 
from Nigeria. The AoG church in this town had a membership of approximately 300 
people, mostly Gun, followed by Yoruba. The main economic activities of its 
members fell into the category of the ‘informal’ sector, combined with occasional 
agricultural activity for self-consumption. Most of them, especially women, were 
small-scale traders, followed by service-oriented activities, such as tailors, 
hairdressers and drivers. Others, a minority, were teachers and low-rank civil 
servants. The majority did not receive a regular income; they lived day by day and 
did not have the possibility to access the services provided by banks. I now turn to 
describe the political and economic context in which Christian churches, especially 
Pentecostal, have flourished in recent years in the Benin Republic. 
 
Neoliberalism and neo-Pentecostalism in Benin Republic  
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Several studies have stressed the historical convergence of the growth of neo- 
Pentecostal churches in Africa with the implementation of neoliberal policies during 
the post-cold war era (Comaroff, 2001, 2009; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2012; 
Freeman, 2012; Gifford, 2004; Krige, 2012; Maxwell, 1998). The liberalisation of 
African economies in the 1980s, the implementation of structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs) and a drastic fall in the living standards of many people, opened 
new avenues for the proliferation of non-government organisations (NGOs) and 
similar organisations in the continent that operate somewhat independently from the 
state (cf. Freeman, 2012: 2). These conditions have created opportunities for these 
organisations to capture foreign ‘development aid’ through various avenues, 
including scams (Smith, 2007: 88–111). In this context, the remarkable growth of so-
called neo-charismatic churches has taken place. Alongside with NGOs, these 
churches and other religious organisations have intervened to fill a void left by the 
state in the provision of social services. They are interpreted as a reaction to a 
societal environment of fear, deprivation and lack of confidence in the future that the 
period of structural adjustment has left among people (cf. Marshall, 1991; Freeman, 
2012). 
In recent years, the study of Christianity in Africa has been dominated by the study of 
so-called neo-Pentecostal churches, particularly in urban contexts. One of the 
central features of these churches is the emphasis they place on the prosperity 
gospel. This is a doctrine that proclaims that every convert, or Born Again, has the 
right to access to God’s blessings in the form of abundant health and wealth (cf. 
Coleman, 2002: 8; Gifford, 2001). It is considered that these churches promote 
individualistic ethics and entrepreneurial values that encourage the formation of 
capitalist attitudes and a moral justification to personal accumulation (cf. Gifford, 
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2004; Maxwell, 1998: 350–354; Meyer, 1998: 186; Smith, 2001: 608). Sometimes 
this moral justification is used to cover up dubious forms of enrichment (Smith, 2007: 
213). Thus, Pentecostals are often perceived as standing very close to the world of 
the ‘occult’ that is used to explain the presence of illegal forms of accumulation and 
enrichment (cf. Comaroff, 2009; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2001; Newell, 2007). 
In the Benin Republic, the growth of neo-Pentecostal churches and their public 
presence has also happened hand in hand with the implementation of neoliberal 
reforms. The political transition in 1991 from a communist country, under Mathieu 
Kerekou’s regime (1972–1991), to democracy was accompanied by the declaration 
of religious freedom, and the consequent proliferation of religious groups. In fact, 
Catholic religious authorities played a crucial role in enabling this democratic 
transition (Claffey, 2007; Mayrargue, 2002, 2006; Strandsbjerg, 2008; Tall, 1995). 
In 1996, Mathieu Kerekou converted to Pentecostalism and returned to power, but 
this time, he was democratically elected. During his electoral campaign, he used his 
Born Again identity to convey his distancing from a sinful past, corruption and ‘the 
forces of evil’ (Mayrargue, 2002; Strandsbjerg, 2000, 2008). Strandsbjerg suggests 
that Kerekou’s ‘conversion’ was part of a political strategy to accommodate to new 
external sources of power, particularly the American donor community (2008: 305). 
Since then, Pentecostalism became the predominant political discourse in the 
country and grounded its influence in state institutions through informal, personal 
networks of local and transnational character (Strandsbjerg, 2005: 225). 
The Pentecostal presence in the political sphere has continued to be predominant. In 
2006, former president of the West Africa Development Bank (BOAD) and a member 
of the AoG church, Thomas Yayi Boni, won the presidential elections. In 2011, he 
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was re-elected to remain in power until 2016. Although, in 2006, Yayi Boni did not 
explicitly exploit a Christian discourse during his campaign, he has always been 
open about his Christian beliefs and church membership (Mayrargue, 2006: 168–
169). During the time of his presidency, several members of his cabinet and 
government offices have been members of the AoG church. In 2010, before the run 
up to 2011 elections, I witnessed the mobilisation of different Evangelical Christian 
groups for prayer meetings across the country, in support of Yayi Boni’s candidacy. 
The imbrication of personal relationships in religious and political networks indicates 
that the moral economy that shapes relationships in one sphere is not very different 
from the other.  
In recent years, the language of the prosperity gospel popularised by neo-
charismatic churches has influenced practices of money offerings and giving across 
different Christian denominations in the country and outside church settings. I should 
clarify, however, that although many neo-charismatic churches in the continent 
proclaim a prosperity gospel, not all Pentecostal churches officially subscribe to this 
theology. For example, the AoG church in Ipese is closer to a classical Pentecostal 
theology and the so-called holiness movement, which emphasises the observance of 
a strict moral conduct among its converts. The pastor and fellowship in this church 
were suspicious of prosperity gospel pastors, especially from Nigeria, who 
emphasised the importance of material wealth as a testimony of God’s blessings. 
One of the reasons for the pervasiveness of the prosperity gospel language outside 
church settings is that ideas of money and spiritual power in southeast Benin are, to 
some extent, compatible with it. In the Yoruba, Fon and Gun Cultures of Southeast 
Benin, health, children and money are considered manifestations of ‘good life’ 
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(Guyer, 2004: 119). The acquisition and spending of money are forms of self-
realisation that articulate social relations. The processes of buying and selling in the 
market; setting credit arrangements; and interests and profits constitute ‘a complex 
of metaphors by which the spiritual and social worlds are envisaged’ (Barber, 1995: 
207). 
These ideas played a role in the way in which money investment practices in 
pyramidal schemes, such as ICC services, intersected with religious life. In the 
prosperity gospel, monetary offerings are considered to be vehicles for tapping into 
God’s power to secure blessings of health and wealth. When a person gives money 
to a church, it becomes a form of personal ‘investment’ in spiritual power, but also in 
social relations with members of the same church. However, to give money, a 
person needs to have access to it. Therefore, ICC services and similar agencies 
became relevant because they provided the cash that people needed to make these 
‘investments’. I now turn to describe the conditions in which ICC services and similar 
agencies started their operations in Benin, and the events that led to ICC services’ 
collapse. 
 
Promises of economic prosperity: money investment practices and pyramidal 
schemes 
At the time of my fieldwork, money investment agencies working as pyramidal 
schemes were very popular. They attracted customers advertising their commitment 
to the alleviation of poverty. Most of these agencies promised a return of at least 50 
per cent on interests per trimester, and up to 200 per cent per year. Although many 
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people held mixed opinions about these agencies, most regarded them rather 
positively, or at least legitimate, until the ICC services affair.  
I met many people who regularly invested their money in ICC services and similar 
agencies. One of them was the pastor of the AoG in Ipese. One day, during our 
conversation, he encouraged me to invest in ICC services. He said that he felt sorry 
that I was a student spending money in Benin without a salary, this way I could make 
some money until my departure. He often encouraged other members of the church 
to do the same, especially those with a regular income, who had the possibility to put 
some savings aside. I learnt that he also invested money whenever he was going 
through economic difficulties. 
In response to his advice, I expressed scepticism towards ICC services. However, 
the pastor reassured me, saying that this organisation was reliable. He had seen on 
national television that the agency invested people’s savings in agricultural products 
abroad, and this is how the agency made profits to pay customers’ interests. 
Moreover, ICC services’ leaders often appeared on TV doing charitable works and, 
on many occasions, the president of Benin had talked favourably of this organisation. 
This information gave him the guarantee and reassurance that their activities could 
not be crooked. Unfortunately, subsequent events proved the opposite. 
ICC services started operating in December 2006, the same year that President Yayi 
Boni began his mandate. The Ministry of the Interior and National Security registered 
this organisation as an NGO. During the four years of its operations, ICC services 
claimed to carry out a wide range of development activities that included agriculture, 
education, construction building, health, information technology and microfinance. 
However, their so-called microfinance activities were their pyramidal investment 
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activities that the national media often described as an American tontine2 or tontine à 
l’américaine. 
In a short period, the leaders of ICC services managed to build a reputable image 
through charitable works advertised in national media. People described them as 
men of good will, who were doing the work of God. In fact, the founder of this 
organisation was a reputable member of the Celestial Church of Christ, with very 
close links to the former leader of this church. Similarly, it had become a very 
popular agency among Pentecostal circles. 
By mid-June 2010 people in Ipese tried to collect their money at the local branch of 
ICC in the neighbouring town of Pobe. However, they were told to return at a later 
date because there were insufficient funds available. Rumour had it that ICC leaders 
had been caught transferring the client’s funds to their personal accounts abroad. A 
few days later, it was officially announced that the agency was bankrupt. In Porto 
Novo’s branch, savers gathered angrily at the doors demanding reimbursement for 
their savings, with no success (Honvoh, 2010). 
In response to people’s discontent, the minister of the interior declared that the 
government had never authorised ICC financial activities, or those of similar 
structures (Kouton, 2010). A couple of days later, ICC leaders were arrested to 
proceed with interrogations. This declaration and arrest appeared suspicious to the 
general public. The general opinion of the people I spoke to was that the government 
could not have been blind to this organisation’s activities, which they had endorsed 
many times on national TV. They also thought that the arrest had been a 
government move to protect ICC leaders from angry mobs. 
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Days later, President Yayi Boni organised a meeting with 88 leaders from other 
money investment agencies. During this meeting, it became evident that the major 
issue at stake was the lack of official legislation to control these organisations’ 
activities. All these agencies were registered as NGOs and not as financial 
institutions. However, in its defence, the government declared that these agencies 
had been allowed to operate in the country with little or no supervision with the 
intention of promoting a free-market economy (Quotidien Le Matinal, 29 June 2010), 
which presumably, would lead to economic growth and social prosperity. With this 
argument, authorities were avoiding taking responsibility for the lack of legislation 
and adequate enforcement of the law. 
Official investigations revealed that the money missing from ICC’s accounts had 
been spent on three main areas. The first was described as ‘public expenditure’. In 
other words, these were ‘gifts’ offered to sponsor events that enhanced the image of 
the head of the state. For example, 3 million CFA (US$5,000 approx.)3 was offered 
to sponsor national celebrations for the international women’s day (E.G., 2010). The 
second area was described as ‘prestige expenditure’ that ICC leaders offered to their 
‘clientele’. One of them declared having spent up to 20 million CFA ($33,998 
approx.) per month on gifts to ministers of the state and judiciary officials, who often 
approached him asking for economic favours. ICC services also sponsored several 
public prayer vigils and meetings in support of the president. The third area was 
‘charitable donations’. These were offered mainly to the Celestial Church of Christ, 
which received enough money to build a new temple and a hospital (Quotidien Le 
Matinal, 9 July 2010). The total loss was calculated to be around 100 billion CFA. In 
an attempt to appease the population, the government promised to reimburse victims 
for their losses by October 2010, but this never happened. 
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At the beginning of July, the minister of the interior was dismissed and held 
temporarily under arrest with charges of traffic of influences and complicity with ICC 
leaders. This event tarnished the political legitimacy of the president because the 
minister of the interior was one of his closest collaborators. It was also a great 
humiliation for Pentecostal and evangelical Christians. The minister of the interior 
was widely known for his Pentecostal affiliation and for having contributed to building 
a strong political clientele among evangelical and Pentecostal groups in Benin. He 
often represented the president at public religious events, such as Pentecostal 
national conventions and public prayers. 
ICC services built its popularity and trust among people because it was an agency 
that seemed to deliver on its promises. It delivered high-interest rates during the 
initial years of its operations; it displayed public demonstrations of solidarity and 
generosity through charitable donations; and its leaders engaged in ‘gift-giving’ 
activities that ‘redistributed’ resources. People did not condemn ICC services’ 
activities until the organisation failed to sustain and deliver these principles. Many 
people were aware that their financial activities were not completely transparent. 
However, they decided to trust it because they could see that it delivered results. 
As this section illustrates, the direct or indirect involvement of religious organisations 
in these types of money-lending schemes and scams is very common. Very often, 
the media and general public blame prosperity gospel preachers for setting up these 
schemes and encouraging people to get rich at any expense. However, this does not 
mean that all Pentecostals or religious organisations can be labelled as corrupt or 
held responsible for these scams. Even though some pastors, like the AoG pastor, 
considered these agencies as legitimate and encouraged their fellowship to invest 
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money in them, it does not make them direct accomplices of their activities. In many 
cases, these pastors were also victims of those who manipulated religious 
discourses and their religious credentials to their advantage. Although these pastors 
follow some principles of the same moral economy as those who commit fraud, this 
does not mean that they also practice fraud. 
I now turn to explore how the activities of ICC services became tightly related to the 
life and activities of the AoG church in Ipese. This micro-level scenario will make 
more visible the principles and values that articulate the moral economy of fraud and 
the church. 
 
The role of economic hardships and social obligations in the moral economy 
of fraud 
One Sunday service, weeks before the ICC services affair happened, members of 
the AoG church in Ipese were encouraged to collect money to buy a plot of land to 
build a temple in an annexe town. During fundraising events such as this, the money 
was collected by encouraging members to give generously as a demonstration of 
their faith in God. At first, members of the church were hesitant about giving money, 
until the main pastor stood up and committed himself to give generously. The money 
collected was handed over to the pastor inside an envelope, so he with other 
members of the church could finalise the purchase. That day, the pastor said, he 
went back home and placed the envelope in a plastic box that he kept in a locked 
compartment under the coffee table in his living room. He normally kept money from 
the church there. Afterwards, he got busy attending other matters. The next day, 
when he went to get the envelope, he realised that it was no longer there. He and his 
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wife looked for it everywhere but could not find it. He deduced that he probably forgot 
to lock the compartment, and concluded that someone must have stolen it while he 
was busy. They were extremely upset because they could not let people down after 
the huge sacrifice they had made to collect the money. I knew he was not lying. Over 
the course of my fieldwork, I developed a close friendship with him and his wife, and 
I knew that they would not dare to keep the money to themselves. 
He decided not to tell the whole assembly about this incident. The reason behind it 
was that pastors in Benin continuously have to invest themselves in gaining and 
maintaining trust from their fellowship. In an environment where livelihoods are 
precarious, distrust is more prevalent than trust (cf. Englund, 2007: 479). Therefore, 
developing mechanisms of accountability within the church is of crucial importance to 
building trust between pastors and their fellowship (ibid., 2007: 485–486). Whenever 
the pastor received donations for specific purposes, members of the church had to 
see concrete evidence, such as witnessing the purchase of the plot of land in this 
case. Moreover, the pastor used to write regular reports to give an account of the 
church’s expenses. This way the people entrusted him with money. 
However, the pastor confided the incident to a select group of close friends and 
some of his fellow pastors, whom he asked to pray for the situation. As soon as they 
heard the news, they immediately offered to lend him money to pay for the plot. 
Interestingly, some of them did it with explicit instructions to deposit part of the 
money in ICC services. This way, the pastor could keep the interest earned to repay 
his debts. In the end, the pastor and his wife managed to save their face with the 
members of the church. They gathered enough money to pay for the plot on the date 
agreed and decided to invest the rest of the money in ICC services to pay their 
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debts. It was not the first time I saw something similar happening. The pastor very 
often went through economic difficulties. However, he and his wife always found 
ways to stay afloat. They relied on their relationships with other people, who usually 
lent them money and/or gave them food or other goods, and by investing money on 
pyramidal agencies they benefitted from the interest received. 
Shortly after this incident, the news about ICC services affair broke. Luckily, the 
pastor was not among the victims of the scam. When he went to ICC services to 
invest part of the money lent, his application was rejected because he was not 
allowed to collect the money before the minimum three-month period stipulated by 
the agency. Since he needed the money before the three-month clause, he decided 
to invest in another agency. However, many members of the church were among 
ICC services’ victims. Some had invested all their savings with the intention of saving 
money to build a house or buy a car. Interestingly, they did not blame the pastor for 
his advice or make him responsible for their situation. After all, the pastor was not 
the one who had profited from the scam at the expense of others. Moreover, the 
pastor had a reputation for honesty and accountability that he had earned through 
his consistent behaviour. In this situation, his reputation helped him to stay away 
from any ill judgement. 
Moreover, everybody knew that the pastor often faced economic hardship because 
he regularly assisted other members of the church. People expected to receive the 
pastor’s support and he responded accordingly. In every church, the pastor is 
considered a kind of surrogate father because of his spiritual endowment and, as 
such, he is regarded as a strong man with certain duties to fulfil. Whenever there 
were fund-raising activities, he first had to set the example to others by donating 
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generously. If he had failed consistently to do so, he would have been judged as 
‘eating the money’, and this would have meant the loss of church membership. 
Many people, including Pentecostals, are very wary and critical of the way in which 
many pastors use their religious credentials to gather money, only to ‘eat it’. In other 
words, these pastors do not comply with the principles of solidarity and redistribution 
that people expected from them. Therefore, these kinds of pastors often end up 
being victims of their ambition: they rarely manage to build a strong or long-lasting 
fellowship. The type of trust that regulates the relationships between pastors and 
their memberships, therefore, is based on elements such as redistribution, solidarity 
and a demonstration of concrete results. 
This incident illustrates that in Benin, people like the AoG pastor, who are in social 
positions that require them to provide for and support others, very often face 
economic hardship. ICC services and similar agencies capitalised on such people. 
For them, ICC services became a viable resource to earn some extra money to stay 
afloat. However, it is worth pointing out that the same pressures that the pastor faced 
to fulfil social obligations were of the similar kind to those that leaders of ICC 
services faced towards their clientele. The moral economy of these pyramidal 
schemes responded to the same logic of social relations and obligations as the 
church. I now explore these parallels in more detail. 
 
Trust-building mechanisms and religious discourses in the moral economy of 
fraud 
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In the last part of this chapter, I want to bring attention to two main issues in the 
moral economy of practices that this case reveals. The first concerns the parallels 
between church dynamics and ICC services and the dynamics of ‘wealth in people’. 
The second aspect concerns the ‘syncretic’ (cf. Olivier de Sardan, 1999) features of 
money investment agencies, such as ICC services, and their use of religious and 
non-religious registers to justify and legitimise their fraudulent operations. 
As mentioned earlier, in this society the so-called dynamics of ‘wealth in people’ play 
a crucial role articulating social relations. The demands of solidarity intrinsic to these 
dynamics, which are central to building trust between people, are often measured by 
economic contributions. When a person is in hardship, she asks for and expects to 
receive support from the members of the same kin group who are senior, considered 
richer or stronger. The same happens at a broader level. When a member of a 
political party is economically or politically stronger than her peers, those in lower 
ranks ask for her economic and social support. The person who is stronger is 
expected to ‘help’ those below her and, by doing this, she builds her political 
platform: patron and clients have a mutually beneficial relationship. However, in a 
precarious context where people spend more money than they make, maintaining 
solidarity and building trust through this principle tends to put a strain on people’s 
economic conditions. Many times, the demands of the ‘smaller’ threaten the collapse 
of the ‘bigger’ by causing economic hardship and pushing her to engage in dubious 
economic activities to fulfil her obligations. 
These dynamics mentioned were clear in the way in which ICC services leaders 
handled their economic resources and their relationships with their clients. Despite 
the perennial nature of pyramidal schemes, the leaders of ICC services faced 
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additional pressure from the increasing demands for solidarity (i.e. redistribution) 
from their political and religious clients. These ended up accelerating the fatal effects 
of this organisation’s collapse. Similar dynamics play out in the church, where the 
pastor who is considered a surrogate father is expected to support his fellowship. 
Many people who, like the pastor, faced these kinds of social obligations and 
expectations, also invested in pyramidal schemes. For them, these organisations 
appeared to be one viable option to earn money and cover their economic needs, 
even though these agencies operated in dubious ways. These people had a strong 
and ‘legitimate’ social motivation to invest their money in these agencies. Therefore, 
practices of money investment in pyramidal schemes need to be understood in the 
light of this societal role. One cannot separate the analysis of the economy and the 
management of economic crises in Benin from their social underpinnings. 
The second element I want to bring attention to is the ‘syncretic’ aspect of these 
money investment practices. ICC services presented itself as a blend of a reputable 
and socially accepted ‘traditional’ institution, such as the tontine, but with a ‘modern’ 
facade. It had some qualities of the saving schemes that usually take place between 
trusted friends. However, it also combined elements that made it look like a thriving 
global investment agency. In their efforts to promote a ‘freemarket economy’, which 
is one of the key elements of SAP conditionality, the government allowed this and 
similar agencies to operate without official legislation. However, the lack of regulation 
became the means by which certain groups, such as the owners of these schemes, 
the churches, pastors and government officials that benefited directly from ICC 
services’ donations, took advantage of the status quo. To fill the void left by a lack of 
legislation, ICC leaders used religious discourses and the endorsement of high-
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ranking members of the government and religious organisations to earn people’s 
trust and secure clients. 
In this sense, religion played a crucial role in two levels: the level of discourse and 
the level of social relations. I have mentioned that the historical popularity of the 
prosperity gospel, with its emphasis on health and wealth, is compatible – to some 
extent – with neoliberal values and aspirations of economic success (cf. Gifford, 
2004; Maxwell, 2005). These discourses have permeated those of other churches 
that do not necessarily subscribe ‘officially’ to its theology. In the same way that 
political actors have used religious discourses to launch their political campaigns (cf. 
Strandsbjerg, 2008), the owners of these schemes have used prosperity gospel 
discourses to earn investors’ trust, and reinforce the idea that large returns on 
investments are a manifestation of God’s blessings. However, religious discourses 
cannot fully explain why people trusted these organisations. Ultimately, a precarious 
economic context provided a fertile soil for these discourses to flourish, and 
pyramidal schemes grounded their success in the social relations that these 
discourses mobilised, especially in the church. 
Friendships and religious networks within churches were the building blocks on 
which ICC services and similar organisations established their bases of trust. For 
example, ICC services invested in charitable donations to the Celestial Church of 
Christ and sponsored Pentecostal prayer vigils and conventions. Although ‘the 
church’ and ‘the market’ became closely interlinked, when ICC services collapsed, 
many people expressed their suspicion and criticism towards their religious (and 
political) leaders. However, they did not necessarily became suspicious of, or 
rejected, their own religious practices. Shortly after these events, I asked one of my 
Published in Whyte, David & Wiegratz, Jörg (eds). 2016. Neoliberalism and the Moral Economy of 
Fraud. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. 170-183. 
 
20 
 
acquaintances, an active member of the Celestial Church of Christ, his opinion about 
ICC services. He said that people who had invested their money in these agencies 
were paying the consequences of their ambition. I also asked his opinion about the 
fact that the founder of ICC services was a member of the Celestial Church of Christ 
and a close friend of its religious leader. He replied: ‘Oh well, I know that not all the 
members of my church are trustworthy, but that does not have to do anything with 
God’. Many members of the AoG church had similar opinions. People were often 
critical of their pastors and were aware that they could potentially let them down. 
However, this suspicion did not undermine their engagement with their own religious 
practices. After all, trust in friendships and religious networks can be rebuilt in a 
different church or setting, if required. 
In a neoliberal context characterised by constant change and uncertainty in the 
economic and political spheres, the religious sphere – as opposed to the other areas 
of social life – can provide with certain continuity. People’s engagement with religion 
often goes beyond the specific social relationships of one particular church or group. 
Different religions, particularly world religions, such as Christianity, also proclaim 
principles, values and norms that go beyond those that prevail in specific social 
settings. Therefore, the religious sphere allows for some room and flexibility to create 
alternative spaces of trust and forms of renewing social relations, especially when 
trust fails in non-religious contexts, such as in politics or ‘the market’. Even in politics, 
when all else fails, politicians tend to draw strategically on different religious groups 
and discourses to provide themselves with legitimacy and supporters. 
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Concluding remarks 
This chapter has explored the relationship between religious organisations and 
financial scams in the Benin Republic. It has outlined some aspects of the moral 
economy of fraud. A focus on trust-building practices and the role of money in 
articulating social relations in Benin has revealed that the dynamics of ‘wealth in 
people’ were crucial in bringing churches and pyramidal schemes very close to each 
other. 
The implementation of neoliberal reforms in the Benin Republic contributed to 
creating the conditions in which ICC services affair took place. These policies have 
facilitated a proliferation of organisations that range from NGOs to pyramidal 
schemes, and a wide variety of churches, in particular, neo-Pentecostal. Some of 
these organisations, especially churches and NGOs, have increasingly taken over 
the provision of social services that were in the hands of the state. Churches have 
gained popularity in a context of uncertainty, fear and deprivation. In particular, neo-
Pentecostalism, with its promises of health and wealth, has become influential 
across Christian denominations and religious groups, with its discourses that speak 
to people’s aspirations for economic prosperity. 
The liberalisation of the economy in Benin has opened opportunities for foreign 
investment and the increase in the flow of money. However, it also has created the 
conditions in which fraudulent organisations can operate with little or no regulation. 
Moreover, the majority of the population still does not have access to formal banking 
systems, and most of them rely on the informal economy. In a context of change and 
lack of formal regulation, the principles of wealth in people continue to articulate 
social relations across the political, economic and religious spheres. Thus, pastors, 
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politicians and leaders of fraudulent organisations often participate in the same moral 
economy. ICC services capitalised on the context outlined above and manipulated 
religious discourses and personal networks to build its legitimacy and secure clients. 
Nevertheless, one should be careful when analysing the role of religion in the moral 
economy of fraud. Just because neo-Pentecostal discourses are compatible with 
certain aspects and aspirations of neoliberalism, it does not mean that they follow 
the same agenda. Christian values are incompatible with an idea of illegal 
enrichment and accumulation. As this case has illustrated, what enabled the 
imbrication of pyramidal schemes and churches was the moral economy that 
articulates relationships in Beninese society through the principles of ‘wealth in 
people’. 
A focus on the moral economy has been useful to understand the imbrication of the 
economy, politics and religion in relation to fraud. However, the moral economy of 
fraud does not exonerate the damage that fraud causes to people who are victims of 
it. Practices perceived as ‘fraudulent’ need to be analysed in relation to the context in 
which they take place. 
 
Notes 
1. This name is a pseudonym.  
2. Tontine is a popular method of saving money in Benin Republic and other parts of West 
Africa. It consists of a group of people, usually friends, who agree to pool a fixed amount 
of money every month that is collected by one member of the group. The recipient of the 
money is consecutively rotated every month until everyone benefits. 
3. Based on an exchange rate of US$1=588.272 XOF (CFA). 
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